

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned to the RM/R Central Files

59-52

Action

FE

Info

RMR

SS

W

G

SP

C

IO

INR

H

EUR

SECRET

Action Assigned to

Classification: Control: 9789

RECEIVED DEPT. OF STATE

March 16, 1959

REVIEWED BY

DATE

RDS [] XDC [] EXT. DATE

TS AUTH.

REASON(S)

ENDORSEMENT (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE

RELEASE DENIED

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

FROM: Taipei

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1015, March 16, 6 p.m.

Reference: Department's 606.

1. On review of President Chiang's New Year's Day address and cited portions of Vice President's February 20 report to Legislative Yuan, we believe Chen Cheng had no intention depart from or modify "strategic guidelines" laid down by President re respective roles of political means and military force, or to imply GRC readiness assume military initiative in Strait.

2. Full translation of portion of Chen's speech immediately preceding part cited in paragraph 4 of Embassy's 957 makes clear his intent adhere closely to President's New Year's Day address:

"President has consistently pointed out to us that counterattack and national recovery is kind of revolutionary struggle, and our revolutionary history has already proven that final victory in revolutionary struggle must depend primarily on people's hearts, and cannot completely rely upon military force; fact that some people abroad, from comparison of our military strength with that of Communists, consider we can not recover mainland, is because they do not understand that this is revolutionary struggle, and not at all purely military struggle."

"Based on this knowledge, President accordingly in his New Year's Day address this year clearly indicated guiding policies of our strategy, saying: 'For this reason, we have based our strategy of counteroffensive and national recovery primarily on political means and secondarily on military force. This means we use principle as our spearhead (0647/6912, also translatable as 'Vanguard') and military force as our shield (1775/4163, also translatable as 'Rearguard'). Main battlefield is on mainland and secondary battlefield is in Taiwan Strait. As for (obtaining) beneficial results

from military

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

Classification

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

Copy No(s)

Destroyed in RM/R

Name

Date

7931 00 / 3 - 1659

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

-2- 1015, March 16, 6 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Taipei.

from military force, the synchronization of revolutionary movements on mainland with military actions in Taiwan Strait is principle we have consistently followed in our planning".

3. As will be apparent from full translation Chen's speech (which being issued shortly by Government Information Office), portion cited reference telegram occupied approximately one-twentieth of entire speech. Balance of speech placed heavy emphasis on domestic economy and other matters not directly related to return to mainland theme.

4. Vice President's use of terms "local military superiority" and "elite forces" was, as noted in WEEKA 7, reference to GRC revised strength goals. These goals stated at somewhat greater length by Vice President in conversation with Draper group February 12 (enclosure 7, EMBDES 435), where term "partial military superiority" was used. In context that conversation, believe it clear primary GRC goal is defensive, i.e., as Chen indicated, to suppress aggressive Communist attempts. Concept of "local superiority" in our understanding, implies recognition GRC cannot hope outmatch Communist forces in absolute sense, but should have capability of massing sufficient qualitatively superior military force at given time and in given limited area to blunt or defeat Communist attack. Example would be "local superiority" achieved by Chinese Air Force during Strait crisis. In these terms, GRC desire achieve "local military superiority" strikes Embassy as reasonable.

LMS:JMR/5

DRUMRIGHT

17 MAR 17 AM 1960
DEPT. OF
STATE

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

Action Taken

59-52

Action
FE

Info

RMR

SS

W

G

SP

C

IO

INR

H

EUR

FROM: Taipei

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1015, March 16, 6 p.m., (Section 2 of 2)

Control
Rec'd:

3838

March 16, 1959

Act:

12:30 P.M.

5. Chen's reference to utilization of "local military superiority" in order "bring about truly effective coordination and concert of military action in Taiwan Strait with Mainland revolutionary movement", in our view, does not imply GRC intent assume military initiative in Taiwan Strait. Particularly in view Chen's warning (paragraph two of Embassy's 957) of "even more ferocious" Communist attacks in strait "in near future", believe his implication this regard was that, given GRC achievement of "local military superiority", renewed Communist assault could be met with severe GRC counterblow, which would touch off revolutionary action by Mainland compatriots, along lines set forth in part III of President's speech.

6. Taking into account reaction of Legislative Yuan and general public to Chen's speech, we do not consider impression was created here he had in any way modified GRC posture on "counterattack" as it has developed since October 23. As noted in past, GRC considers periodic emphasis on "liberation" themes essential sustain morale here, among overseas Chinese, and on Mainland. Joint communique has caused adjustment of this theme to make clear restoration of freedom on Mainland will be achieved not by invasion from Taiwan, but by Mainland revolt in which GRC will join. However, within these limits, GRC is determined for psychological and political reasons to maintain as much of posture of initiative as possible. In our view, attempt by US to persuade GRC to water down "liberation" themes further would be inadvisable, would seem to GRC arbitrary effort delimit hope of return to Mainland and would tend to confirm GRC suspicion that we are aiming at a "two Chinas" policy.

7. In light foregoing, we believe it would be inadvisable to tax Chen with intent to depart from sense and intent of joint communique. Chen's was most steady influence here on side

of restraint

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

SECRET FILE

FD-713.00/3-16-59

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- 1015, March 16, 6 p.m., (Section 2 of 2), from Taipei

of restraint and moderation during Strait crisis. As instance would refer to his last previous State of Nation speech to Legislative Yuan September 16, 1958. In that speech, on day following first Warsaw talk, Chen threw his great prestige on side of restraint and confidence in US (WEEKA 38) and thereby exerted noticeable moderating effect on opinion.

8. Accordingly, while we concur as to desirability of reminding GRC as needed of great importance of steadfast adherence to position adopted in joint communique, we do not believe approach pegged to criticism of Chen's speeches (and by implication of President's New Year's Day address as well), would be appropriate for this purpose.

DRUMRIGHT

AAL/UE/11

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED